M. A. G. Osmani Biography, Age, Height, Wife, Net Worth and Family

The sector commanders reviewed Mukti Bahini activities from June to August, and Osmani made an overall assessment in September. The findings were disappointing; their network had not taken root, with many guerrillas withdrawing under Pakistani pressure. Amid Mukti Bahini supply problems, Bangladesh was losing ground in the international arena. Although regular Bengali regular troops attacked the BoPs with spirit, more training, better communication and coordination with the Indian Army were needed for a successful conventional campaign. The attack on Kamalpur by the 1st EBR was repulsed, but the 3rd EBR attack on Bahadurabad was successful; attacks by the 2nd, 11th and 4th EBR had mixed results.

The Bengalis put up an unexpectedly stiff resistance, derailing the initial Pakistani estimate of pacifying East Pakistan by 10 April. Their initial success was unsustainable. They began experiencing a lack of trained men, officers, coordination, a central command structure and supplies (despite some aid from the BSF) although most of the country was still free of Pakistani control. The Pakistani Army airlifted its 9th and 16th Infantry Divisions to Bangladesh by 10 April, and was poised to seize the initiative. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, after a briefing by the departing East Pakistan GOC, implemented a strategy to clear all large cities of insurgents and secure Chittagong; to control and open all river, road and rail networks; to drive the insurgents away from the country’s interior, and to launch combing operations across Bangladesh to wipe out the insurgency.

In 1983, at age 65, Osmani was diagnosed with cancer at the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Dhaka and was flown to London for treatment at St Bartholomew’s Hospital at government expense. Most of his time in the UK was spent at the home of his nephew and niece, Mashahid Ali and Sabequa Chowdhury. He died on 16 February 1984. Osmani’s body was flown to Bangladesh, and he was buried with full military honours adjacent to his mother’s grave in Darga, Sylhet.

Osmani entered politics in independent Bangladesh, serving as a Member of Parliament and cabinet minister in the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Along with Mainul Hosein, he resigned from parliament in opposition to the creation of the one party state of BAKSAL. He advised the government on restoring the chain of command in the military after the 15 August coup. He contested the 1978 Bangladeshi presidential election against Ziaur Rahman. Osmani died in London in 1984 and was buried in his hometown of Sylhet.

Osmani resigned from the cabinet in May 1975, after the introduction of a one-party government in accordance with the fourth amendment to the constitution. He and Mainul Hosein resigned from the Awami League in protest of the abolition of democracy in Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Osmani briefly was an advisor to the president on 29 August 1975, after Rahman’s assassination.

Osmani did not support the 15 August 1975 assassinations, and did not tolerate undue criticism of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He accepted a post as defense advisor (the equivalent of a cabinet minister) to Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, who took over as president after the 15 August coup and may have been involved. Osmani, who ignored advice to avoid the Mushtaq government, was appointed to the post after Ziaur Rahman was appointed Army Chief of Staff on 24 August 1975 and Khalilur Rahman became Chief of Staff in the Defense Ministry. Although it was a cabinet post, Osmani did not draw a salary. He visited several Army formations, stressing the need for discipline and morale, and may have hoped to prevent further bloodshed with his influence on the armed forces. As defense advisor, he did not oppose the promotion of the 15 August coup leaders or the reinstatement of retired army officers involved in the coup. The coup leaders had installed themselves in Bangabhaban, disregarding the army chain of command, and Osmani accepted the situation. He tried to implement the decision to disband the Jatya Rakshi Bahini, placing its members in police and anser organizations, before Ziaur Rahman received approval to integrate Rakshi Bahini formations into the army in October 1975. The coup leaders maintained control of the 1st Bengal Lancer and 2nd Field Artillery units (involved in the 15 August coup) and deployed outside the army chain of command. Their actions, demonstrating the weakness of the chain of command, created a de facto parallel command structure.

The Bangladeshi government issued four medals of valor to the freedom fighters: the Bir Sreshtho, Bir Uttom, Bir Bikrom and Bir Protik. The list of recipients was made by Osmani and several sector commanders at the beginning of 1972. When it was published, it was criticised and initially cancelled; Osmani was accused of bias for supporting the list.

Osmani and the Mukti Bahini senior sector commanders met in Dhaka from 2 to 11 January 1972 to discuss the future of the Bangladesh armed forces and other issues. Wounded sector-eleven commander Abu Taher and the commander of the closed sector nine were not present. A committee was set up to form a national militia from the Mukti Bahini and members of the former East Pakistan Rifles. Sector-three commander A. N. M. Nuruzzaman was chosen to command the militia.

On 16 February 1972, tension between Mukti Bahini members and former EPR members who had not fought in the war erupted into a shootout in Pilkhana. Although Osmani was informed of the incident, he was unable to enter Pilkhana due to the ongoing gunfire. The firing stopped at the arrival of President Mujibur Rahman, and Osmani. Rahman defused the situation. It was decided to keep the EPR intact as the Bangladesh Rifles and create another force, Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini, from the Mukti Bahini members. In April 1972 the Bangladeshi government abolished the post of commander-in-chief, replacing it with a Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff to separate the services’ command structures.

In 1972, the Bangladeshi government issued a presidential decree in 1972 changing the cadet colleges to government colleges. A delegation of former cadets visited Ziaur Rahman, who helped them obtain an appointment with Osmani. Osmani discussed the issue with President Mujib Rahman, and the decree was withdrawn.

Osmani attended the Long Term Staff Course at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan and served with Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan and A. A. K. Niazi, all of whom led the Pakistan Army against his Bangladesh forces in 1971. After completing the course, Osmani joined the staff of army chief of staff Reginald Hutton in January 1949 and (as chair of a committee tasked by Douglas Gracey to evaluate army enlistment standards) recommended the establishment of cadet colleges in East Pakistan. He later became an assistant adjutant general.

Osmani was not directly involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Those involved sought his opinion through Khandker Nazmul Huda (Accused No. 27, sub-sector commander of the BDF in 1971 and a Bangladesh Army colonel in 1975), and Osmani recommended a political solution for the discrimination faced by Bengalis in Pakistan. He had been questioned in 1958, before the trials began, on issues related to the case.

Osmani and Ishfakul Majid formed part of the military advisory team for the Awami League leadership in 1971. As the political crisis deepened in March, many Bengali officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces looked to Bengali politicians for guidance and Osmani coordinated the clandestine meetings. Bengali military officers, alarmed by the buildup of Pakistani forces and concerned about their own safety, maintained contact with Rahman; some maintained contact with Awami League leaders through Osmani, who reportedly agreed to coordinate the activities of Bengali units. Toeing the party line, he advised the officers (including M. R. Mazunder, Chittagong martial-law administrator and Rezaul Jalil, CO of the 1st EBR) against “rash” actions.

Before the crackdown the student and youth wings of the Awami League set up training camps and trained volunteers with Bengali helpers and student cadets. The league leadership declared independence on 7 March 1971. Bengali ex-servicemen held rallies supporting independence; officers and troops kept abreast of the political situation in East Pakistan, which was becoming uncertain and confrontational. Majid and Osmani reportedly designed a military plan of action: capture the Dhaka airport and Chittagong seaport, sealing off the province. The EPR and police would capture Dhaka, aided by Awami League volunteers, and cantonments would be neutralized by Bengali soldiers. Bengali officers advised sabotaging the fuel dumps at Narayanganj and Chittagong to ground Pakistani air power and cripple armed-force mobility.

Osmani was at the home of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when Bengali officers informed Awami League leaders of Yahia Khan’s departure and the army movements. After Rahman refused to go into hiding, Osmani hid in Dhaka until 29 March, shaved off his mustache (he was known as “the man attached to a mustache”) and left for the Indian border. He went to Jingira, then by boat to Daudkandi (where suspicious residents detained him before the brother of the local member of parliament helped free him). Osmani walked and crossed the Gomoti by boat (with the help of a Bengali army signal corps officer), reaching India by 2 April 1971.

Osmani arrived at Teliapara, where the 2nd and 4th East Bengal Regiments (EBR) established a temporary base with a member of the BSF on 2 April 1971. He held a meeting of Bengali officers on 4 April, attended by M. A. Rab, 2 EBR CO K. M. Shafiullah, 4 EBR CO Khaled Musharraf, 8 EBR CO Ziaur Rahman, Salahuddin Reza, Qazi Nurujjaman and Shafat Jamil. Osmani proposed that the 2nd and 4th EBR occupy Comilla, and asked Jaman to formulate a fireplan. After objections by other officers that the battalions would incur crippling losses, the proposal was dropped. Zia proposed that all available forces surround Chittagong, to hold the area as long as possible; this idea was also dropped as impractical. The commanders agreed to send two companies (one each from 2 and 4 EBR) to aid the 8th EBR under Ziaur Rahman.

Osmani toured Mukti Bahini positions in Sylhet, and on 9 April he visited Aziz with 2 EBR Charlie Company near Sylhet. That day another conference took place, attended by Director General Rustomji of the BSF and Bengali officers. At the meeting Osmani was elected commander of Bengali forces, and an agreement was reached with Indian officers on logistical assistance. The need to form a Government in exile was agreed, to distinguish the struggle from a mere military revolt. The conference abruptly adjourned when Osmani left after he heard that five PAF jets were inbound. The following day, three more sector commanders were appointed: Nazmul Huq (Rajshahi-Pabna) and captains for Rangpur-Dinajpur and Barisal. The Pakistan Army appointed A. A. K. Niazi GOC for East Pakistan the same day. On 12 April, the Bengali government in exile at Agartola appointed Osmani commander of the Mukti Bahini. With the formation of the Bangladesh government on 17 April 1971, he was reinstated to active duty and appointed commander-in-chief.

Osmani took command of the Mukhti Bahini after 17 April 1971. Since the Bengali forces were geographically isolated and lacked command staffs and a communications network, real-time command was impossible. Osmani allowed the sector commanders to fight as they saw fit, while he toured the sectors and met with Indian officials in New Delhi and Kolkata concerning weapons and communications. Although India did not offer material aid, it helped design Mukhti Bahini structure and expressed the possibility of future Indian intervention.

From April to June Osmani toured to boost morale and gather information, meeting with his Indian counterparts and setting up the Bangladeshi command structure. The Indian Army launched Operation Jackpot; by mid-June Bengali soldiers were driven into India, developing the infrastructure for a sustained, coordinated guerrilla campaign. Although the Bengali high command had begun to rebuild and redeploy Mukti Bahini units in mid-May, in June and July, Mukti Bahini activity slacked off and the insurgency faltered. Running the war was difficult because of the shortage of trained officers. From 17,000 active-duty Bengali soldiers (Army and EPR) who faced Pakistan on 25 March 1971, about 4,000 were taken prisoner.

Although Osmani made strategy decisions and liaised with Indian officers from July to December 1971, he did not organize an operation like the Tet Offensive or lead a battle similar to Dien Bien Phu as commander-in-chief. His strategy (a product of his military career and the demands of the situation on the ground) influenced his leadership style, and he relied on his background in the Southeast Asian sector during World War II.

The Pakistan army, after expelling the Mukti Bahini from Bangladesh by May 1971, experienced relative peace in June and July. Mukti Bahini activity had lessened during the months of preparation. The Indian army began shelling border outposts (about half of the 370 outposts were destroyed by the end of July) to facilitate infiltration into occupied territories. Bengali regular forces were not ready for operation until mid-July. With the conflict largely centred around the India-East Pakistan border region, the Pakistani Eastern Command began reorganizing their forces to consolidate control of the province. An East Pakistan Civil Armed Force, with 17 operational wings, was raised from West Pakistani and Bihari volunteers, Razakars (50,000), Al-Badr and Al Shams (5,000 from each unit). Five thousand police were flown in from West Pakistan.

Osmani was not in Dhaka for the surrender ceremony on 16 December 1971. His helicopter, flying from Sylhet, was hit in midair by gunfire and crash-landed in a field. After the crash, the injured Osmani and his crew were rescued by an Indian surveillance jeep. Out of touch with Indian and Bangladeshi HQ, he could not reach Dhaka in time for the ceremony.

After the war ended with the surrender of the Pakistan armed forces to the joint command of India and Bangladesh on 16 December 1971, Osmani arrived in Dhaka on 22 December and set up his HQ (probably in the Log Area HQ Building in the Dhaka cantonment). On 9 January 1972, he arranged an honor guard to greet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on his return to Tezgaon Airport. The Bangladeshi government decided to promote him to a two-star ranked officer (the first in Bangladeshi history) through a battlefield promotion to maintain the chain of command in the army. He was promoted on 7 April 1972, effective retroactively on 16 December 1971.

M. A. Rab, the first Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army (12 April 1971 – 7 April 1972), was promoted to major general and retired on 7 April 1972. Osmani, reportedly consulted about his successor, recommended K. M. Shafiullah. The four serving senior army officers who joined Mukti Bahini in March 1971 from the Pakistan Army were Salahuddin Mohammad Reza, C. R. Dutta, Ziaur Rahman and Shafiullah.

Ziaur Rahman joined the war on 25 March 1971, and Shafiullah joined three days later. Although they were commissioned in the Pakistan Army on the same day (completing the 12th PMA Long Course on 18 September 1955), Rahman was above Shafiullah in the final rankings. Osmani disliked Rahman, and wanted to discharge him after the battle of Kamalpur. However, Osmani may not have made a recommendation and Shafiullah’s appointment may have been a political decision.

After his retirement Osmani entered East Pakistani politics, joining Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s All Pakistan Awami Muslim League in 1970. As an Awami League candidate, he was elected to the national assembly from the Balaganj-Fenchuganj Upazila area of Sylhet. Osmani did not serve as a Pakistani MNA, because after the beginning of the Bangladesh War of Independence he joined its provisional government.

The Pakistani high command did not increase the number of Bengali units until 1969, when (after a pledge by Yahya Khan) the number of Bengal regiments were increased to 10 and all new units were ordered to ensure a minimum 25-percent annual Bengali representation among their recruits. Osmani, known as “Papa Tiger”, was revered by the Bengali troops because of his efforts on their behalf. Although he was not the senior Bengali officer (Ishfakul Majid, commissioned out of Sandhurst in 1924, was older) and did not reach the highest Bengali rank in the Pakistani army (as did Lt. General Khwaja Wasiuddin), Osmani, Wasiuddin and M. H. Mozumdar were patrons of the Bengali troops.

Osmani retired from the Pakistan Armed Forces on 16 February 1967. Although he had failed to increase the number of Bengal regiments, the Pakistani high command (at the recommendation of Maj. Gen. Khwaja Wasiuddin) put the existing regiments through a battery of exercises in West Pakistan to test their adaptability and combat readiness. The evaluator of the exercises said the Bengali units performed well, their pride in representing East Pakistan a component of their success, and opposed their replacement with mixed regiments.

After the war, Osmani chaired the committee tasked with determining future army-reserve and logistical requirements and was president of the Army Sports Control Board from July 1965 to April 1966. On 16 May 1966, he went on leave prior to retirement (LPR). Osmani’s successor as DDMO was Rao Farman Ali, who played a controversial role in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Ali was reportedly horrified at Osmani’s treatment by the army; his office was run-down, Osmani was kept out of the loop and office employees treated him with disdain. According to Ali, Osmani was not promoted because he was Bengali and deemed untrustworthy by the high command.

Osmani was sidelined by the Pakistani generals, despite his service as DDMO during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Instead he devoted himself to the East Bengal regiments. He complained that the Pakistani press suppressed the contributions of his 1st Bengal unit, which was posted in Kasur during the war. Successive Bengali and non-Bengali COs of the 1 EBR built on Osmani’s foundation, and under the command of A. T. K. Haque its battalion received 17 awards for gallantry (including two Sitara-e-Jurats and nine Tamgha-i-Jurats)—the largest number of awards of any Pakistan unit in the war. When Osmani visited the unit and recommended a Nishan-e-Haider for a member, he was reportedly furious when the battalion CO disregarded his recommendation. He organized Bengal regimental reunions, seizing every opportunity to enhance the reputation of Bengali units.

By 1958 Osmani was deputy director of the general staff and then deputy director of military operations under Yahya Khan, a position he held until his retirement eight years later. Although he reached the rank of colonel in the first decade of his career, during the next decade he did not receive a promotion. During Osmani’s tenure as DDMO in the General Staff Branch, he was a Pakistan Army advisor at CENTO, SEATO and Pakistan Air Defense Committee meetings.

When Osmani joined GHQ in 1956, three East Bengal regiments and the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC) were part of the Pakistan Army. Over the next nine years the number of Punjab regiments grew (reorganized in 1956) reached almost 50, the Frontier Force and Baluch Regiments grew. Many senior army officers believed in the martial-race theory, and considered Bengalis poor military material. Bengali recruits, generally smaller in stature than West Pakistanis, often failed to meet minimum physical requirements (which were based on average West Pakistani physical characteristics). Many Pakistani officers favored mixed regiments over Bengali ones and some officers felt that increasing the number of Bengali formations threatened Army unity.

Osmani was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became a senior advisor at CENTO headquarters in Baghdad as part of the Pakistan military delegation from December 1955 to May 1956. He was promoted to acting colonel in May 1956, joining the Pakistan Army GHQ at Rawalpindi as deputy director for military operations (DDMO). In August and September 1957 he served as an acting brigadier, serving as DDMO until May 1966. Osmani received the permanent rank of colonel in 1961, and received advanced weapons training in the United States three years later. He served under Gul Hassan Khan in 1964, who felt that Osmani had been passed over for promotion. Khan allowed him to focus on the Bengal regiments.

He commanded the 107th Brigade in Jessore from April to October 1953 (when he was promoted to major), rejoining 1 EBR as CO until February 1954. After Osmani completed the GHQ law course and left the EBRC, he became an additional commandant (later deputy director) of the East Pakistan Rifles under the provincial government of East Bengal in March 1955. In the EBR, he expanded the recruitment of non-Bengali minority groups and ended recruiting from West Pakistan.

Osmani disagreed with Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Gen. Ayub Khan over the treatment of Ishfakul Majid, the senior Bengali army officer in who was falsely accused in the Rawalpindi conspiracy and forced to resign. In August 1951 Osmani left 5/14 Punjab and was posted as third CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment, the first Bengali to hold the post, in October.

Osmani became the CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment, stationed in Jessore as part of the 107th Brigade, on 8 November 1951. He chose Bengali songs for regimental marching and its band (“Chol Chol Chol” by Kazi Nazrul Islam, “Gram Chara oi ranga matir poth” by Rabindranath Tagore and Dhono Dhanne Pushpe Bhora by D.L. Roy), and the Brotochari (introduced by Shodoy Dutt) became the regimental dance. Osmani ordered his NCOs to submit daily situation reports in Bangla. This display of Bengali culture was frowned on by his Punjabi superiors, who disliked the adoption of what they saw as Hindu culture. Osmani was commandant of the East Bengal Regimental Center in Chittagong from February 1953 to January 1955.

Khwaja Wasiuddin was the most senior ranked East Pakistani officer in the Pakistan Army after the forced retirement of Maj. Gen. Ishfakul Majid in 1951. Wasiuddin was ranked Lieutenant General commanded the Pakistan Army’s II Corps in 1971 (based in Multan, Punjab). He planned to defect but was unable to do so when he was posted to Rawalpindi Army HQ as the master general of ordnance. After Pakistan’s defeat, he opted for Bangladesh and was interned in his home. Wasiuddin went to London in October 1972 before coming to Bangladesh. Osmani and Wasiuddin served together in 1959 at Rawalpindi GHQ, and they had a cordial relationship.

After serving as a staff officer for eight years, Osmani joined the Pakistan Army infantry. With a rank of major and after induction training, he joined the 5/14 Punjab. He was posted as 2IC and company commander of the 5th Punjab Battalion of the 14th Punjab Regiment, part of a brigade commanded by Ayub Khan, in 1950. Osmani became commander of the 105th Brigade Training Team in January 1951 and commander of the 5/14 Punjab in May, followed by a four-month tour of duty in Kashmir and Waziristan.

After the 1947 birth of India and Pakistan in 1947, Osmani joined the Pakistan Army on 7 October 1947. He was promoted to acting lieutenant colonel on 7 January 1948. He was assigned to general-staff headquarters as GSO-1, Coordination, Planning and Personnel.

Pakistan mustered six infantry divisions and one armored brigade after the division of the British Indian army in 1947. These formations were neither fully equipped nor staffed. The number of Bengali officers and soldiers in the Pakistan armed forces was small, due to the British preference for recruiting from the martial races and the departure of many non-Muslim Bengali personnel for the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army raised two battalions of the East Bengal Regiment from 1947 to 1950, and Punjab regiments were inherited from the British Indian Army. The Azad Kashmir Regiment was created soon after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947.

He was attached to British Indian Army HQ Bihar and Orissa Area from May to July 1946. On 13 July 1946, Osmani was granted a regular commission in the British Indian Army, with a promotion to substantive captain on 5 October 1946. He subsequently completed the Senior Officers Course in February 1947, and was promoted to local lieutenant colonel. He was posted to British Indian Army GHQ in Simla in the Quartermaster General and Ordnance Branches until August 1947. From August to 6 October 1947 he served as GSO-2 at the HQ of Claude Auchinleck in New Delhi. Although Osmani had passed the Indian Civil Service examination, he declined a foreign-service position in 1947 to remain with the Pakistan Army. He witnessed the end of the British Indian Army, representing Pakistan during the division of army assets between India and Pakistan.

Osmani was promoted to the ranks of war-substantive lieutenant and temporary captain on 17 February 1941. He received a battlefield promotion to acting major on 23 February 1942, with further promotions to war-substantive captain (temporary major) on 23 May. Between 1941 and 1945, he held the posts of platoon commander, battalion adjutant, company 2IC and battalion commander. From November 1944 to February 1945, Osmani was a grade-two general staff officer at his formation headquarters, completing the Senior Officers Course after the war.

When he joined the British Indian Army, Osmani was a member of the 4th Urban Infantry from 1939 to 1940. On 5 October 1940, he received an emergency commission as a second lieutenant in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC). Osmani was initially attached to the 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington Regiment, which was tasked with a New Delhi depot. After he completed the Short Mechanical Transport Course (November 1940 – February 1941) and Junior Tactical Course (February – April 1941), he was attached to a mechanical transport battalion of the XV Corps and posted to Burma during World War II.

Osmani attended Cotton School in Sylhet, matriculating at Sylhet Government Pilot High School in 1934. He studied English and Persian. He won the Pritoria Prize for excellence in English. Osmani studied geography at Aligarh Muslim University, and graduated in 1938. He enrolled as a cadet at the Indian Military Academy the following year.

Muhammad Ataul Goni Osmani (Bengali: মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গণি ওসমানী; 1 September 1918 – 16 February 1984), also known as Bangabir (the Hero of Bengal), was a Bengali military leader. Osmani’s career spanned five decades, beginning with service in the British Indian Army in 1939. He fought in the Burma Campaign during World War II. After the partition of India in 1947, he joined the Pakistan Army and served in the East Bengal Regiment, retiring as a colonel in 1967. Osmani joined the Provisional Government of Bangladesh in 1971 as the commander-in-chief of the nascent Bangladesh Forces. Regarded as the founder of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, Osmani retired as a four-star general from the Bangladesh Army in 1972.

Osmani was born into a Bengali Muslim landowning family in Sunamganj, Assam Province, British India, on 1 September 1918. He was a descendant of Shah Nizamuddin Osmani, a 14th-century associate of Shah Jalal. His ancestral village is in Dayamir Union within Osmani Nagar Upazila of Sylhet District.